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Abstract
This article surveys recent work in pragmatism and political theory. In doing so, it shows
both how recent work on pragmatism has secured the view that at its core is a set of
arguments about the character of democracy – although the character of those argu-
ments is open to debate and reimagination – and how pragmatist arguments have
been reinterpreted and deployed to address contemporary concerns and approaches.
This charts a terrain of live disagreements rather than settled opinion.
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Introduction
A dominant view for much of the twentieth century, expounded by such diverse voices as
Lewis Mumford, Louis Hartz, Bernard Crick, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse,
Christopher Lasch, John Diggins, and Sheldon Wolin, was that pragmatism is a philoso-
phy for liberal technocrats, an account of how to think flexibly about the achievement of
socially endorsed parochial goals but with few resources to think critically about those
goals. For others, including Bertrand Russell and William Elliott, its apparent laxity
about objectivity made it susceptible to capture by darker forces, such as fascism
(a point some fascists were happy to accept). The frame for contemporary readings in
political theory is very different and largely organised around the idea that pragmatism
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has a normative contribution to make to our understanding of the character and justifica-
tion of democracy but that it is debatable exactly what that is.1 And this remains the dom-
inant frame for current work, in part reflecting the massive efflorescence of normative
democratic theory over the period, including deliberative and epistemic arguments that
have affinities with pragmatism.
Any account of pragmatism needs to acknowledge its internal strife, porous boundar-
ies, contentious historiography, as well as a complex relation with politics, even if it’s not
possible to do all these themes justice in this space.2 ‘Pragmatism’ has been a contested
and vague philosophical term since its inception. A year after William James published
Pragmatism (as a ‘new name for an old way of thinking’ (James, 1979 [1907])) and a
decade after James gave the term its public philosophical debut, Arthur O. Lovejoy glee-
fully distinguished thirteen pragmatisms, ‘a baker’s dozen of contentions which are sepa-
rate not merely in the sense of being discriminable, but in the sense of being logically
independent, so that you may without inconsistency accept any one and reject all the
others, or refute one and leave the philosophical standing of the others unimpugned’
(Lovejoy, 1908: 5). More have proliferated since then and the questions of what pragma-
tists agree on and what distinguishes all and only pragmatists remain quite open.
Sometimes the doctrine is viewed very capaciously, as for instance when in a recent
guide to political epistemology, the philosopher Simon Blackburn refers to ‘the long suc-
cession of pragmatists, from Hobbes through Berkeley, Hume, to Peirce, Dewey,
Ramsey, and Wittgenstein’ (Blackburn, 2021: 65). To add to this list, Heidegger,
Rawls, Habermas, and Deleuze, to take a mixed bag, have also had significant strands
of their work dubbed pragmatist
Further, as Eric MacGilvray writes, ‘[p]ragmatism was only ever meant to provide a
theory of meaning and justification, and not a substantive theory of the good. It is this
theory of meaning and justification that the founding pragmatists (and their critics)
were talking about when they were talking about pragmatism, and so we must be
careful to define pragmatism in these terms rather than to associate it with the moral
and ethical commitments of any particular time, place, or thinker’ (MacGilvray, 2004:
11). When it comes to political theory, this can be tricky methodological advice to
follow, however, sound it is as philosophical point. In part this is because the connections
between pragmatism as theory of meaning or justification – themselves quite different
theories – and other aspects of a pragmatist’s philosophy (e.g. James’s and Dewey’s
radical empiricism and conceptions of experience) are often contestable, so it isn’t
clear what falls on which side of the line. And in part, it is because in interpreting and
evaluating the heterogeneous field of politics pragmatists draw on diverse philosophical
resources.
Probably the most fruitful approach to thinking about definitional issues follows
Bernstein (1992) in taking pragmatism to consist in conflict bound by a set of unifying con-
cerns and points of disagreement, in part about what pragmatism is. Most contemporary
thinking about pragmatism emerges from a kind of pincer movement. From one direction,
the protagonists of this conflict, and of ‘America’s homegrown philosophy’ (Misak, 2013:
ix), are ostensively defined – Charles Sanders Peirce, James, John Dewey, G. H. Mead,
et al., – with arguments made for inclusion or exclusion. From the other side, some
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more general commitments can be identified, which pragmatists tend to adhere to, and these
can be used as principles of selection. Four commitments, in particular, are salient, although
these are fleshed out in different ways by different authors. These include (i) fallibilism: that
is, the idea that all opinions are in principle open to criticism and revision; (ii) anti-
scepticism: doubt shouldn’t be all-embracing – we need a reason to doubt not just to
believe; and (iii) a belief that ‘practice is primary in philosophy’ (Putnam, 1994: 152):
we should focus on the consequences of beliefs and their role in actual practices to under-
stand or justify them. (iv) Finally, there isn’t a difference in cognitive standing between
beliefs about facts and values: both play an indispensable role in our practices. For pragma-
tists, the significance of this cluster of commitments for politics flows from the sense that
these can’t themselves coherently be detached from practice. As Dewey puts it:
If the pragmatic ideal of truth has itself any pragmatic worth, it is because it stands for carry-
ing the experimental notion of truth that reigns among the sciences, technically viewed, over
into political and moral practices, humanly viewed. (Dewey, 1978 [1911]: 31).
Some pragmatists vehemently reject this last point: for example, Rorty (1991), at least
sometimes, and Posner (2003) suggest that pragmatism has no particular political
valence. Quite a lot of recent pragmatist political theory can be understood as an
attempt to rebut Rorty’s and Posner’s position on this.
In surveying recent work, I’ll particularly bring out both how recent work on pragmatism
has secured the view that at its core is a set of arguments about the character of democracy –
although the character of those arguments is open to debate and reimagination – and how
pragmatist arguments have been reinterpreted and deployed to address contemporary con-
cerns and approaches. To do so, however, is to chart a terrain of live disagreements
rather than settled opinions.
Pragmatism in the conversation of contemporary political
theory
Richard Rorty remains for many the most high-profile recent self-described pragmatist
and popular gateway into a broader engagement with this tradition. His influence has
also persisted through a series of posthumous works and some influential commentaries
since his death in 2007, although it is safe to say it has faded since the era when ritual
denunciation of his views was a requirement across a wide range of disciplines. His
own conception of pragmatism is notoriously idiosyncratic and went through various pre-
sentations. In later work, Rorty settled on a conception of pragmatism as what he calls
anti-authoritarianism, a fulfilment of an Enlightenment proposal that norms should be
thought of not as issuing from divine commands but from the social agreement.
Objectivity isn’t best viewed as consisting in responsiveness to the way the world is
but as a project of securing solidarity with other human beings. This proposal itself
isn’t offered as a requirement of rationality or especially perspicuous representation of
what we should do but as an intervention in what Rorty calls ‘cultural politics’, an inspira-
tional redescription of how we think about rationality and human nature that we should
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try out in the hope of greater freedom and self-fulfilment (Rorty, 2007). Rorty blends this
with scepticism about the contribution of theory to the reality of political engagement and
action. Politics shouldn’t rest on principles such as the recognition of a common human
nature but on a commitment to widening the circle of those to whom we feel loyalty,
building solidarity with the weak and excluded. Where we haven’t achieved this sense
of solidarity, compelling illustration of suffering is far more effective than philosophical
reflection in creating it.
Even among those sympathetic to pragmatism, few have readily endorsed this
vision, since they tend to believe that on its own terms it lacks the inspirational
content it claims (e.g. Talisse, 2014) and that the account of norms as in terms of
answerability to fellow particular human beings fails to capture the need for a
concept of moral or political objectivity to answer to something beyond the contin-
gent agreement of some particular community. At the level of political argument, it
seems to affirm a hierarchy between those who offer solidarity and those who need
it (e.g. Phillips, 2015). Does this leave only a kind of scepticism about philosophical
foundationalism as Rorty’s legacy? Clayton Chin in a recent study discerns a ‘deeper
positive project in Rorty’ (Chin, 2018: 203). This is the project of cultural politics,
understood as a process of trying to provide more fruitful, humane and useful descrip-
tions, and it is this cultural politics that offers a conception of public dialogue that
supports social criticism across radically diverse societies. On Chin’s account, ordin-
ary rational argument is only possible in normalised situations where established stan-
dards are in place. The pluralistic societies that preoccupy contemporary political
theory aren’t like this, however: their diverse vocabularies, in Chin’s Rortyan
terms, lack a common framework of principles in relation to which political disagree-
ments can be adjudicated. Instead, they call for a form of contestation in political
theory for those moments which Nancy Fraser (following Thomas Kuhn and Rorty)
calls abnormal, where established assumptions about the character and scope of poli-
tical argument are up for grabs (Fraser, 2017) – that is, for Rortyan cultural politics. In
the absence of shared theoretical criteria, a cultural-political argument consists of
comparative interpretative interventions, a matter of offering new descriptions and
seeing what we make of alternative ways of doing things.
The political significance of this for Chin is that he holds that it provides a ‘method for
the critical reconciliation of diverse ways of speaking’, effectively engaging ‘those with
whom we share no normative horizon. [Rorty] offers it as a metavocabulary of intervo-
cabulary normative exchange in the absence of agreed-upon criteria and without refer-
ence to an external source of authority. By expanding the logical spaces we inhabit to
include new groups and languages, Rorty places an important agonistic constraint that
opens up existing standards and consensuses’ (Chin, 2018: 208). In this way, Rorty pro-
vides ‘a general governing ethos for the cultural-political realm that allows the pursuit of
common social change among cultural-political diversity: commonality among nonhier-
archical difference’ (Chin, 2018: 209, emphasis in original). This is an ethos of inclusive
tolerance. Perhaps most importantly, this directly tries to address the uncomfortable sense
that Rorty’s sentimentalist solidarity speaks de haut en bas – that it envisages justice in
the form of a comfortable group extending its patronage to a more or less dimly perceived
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group of suffering outsiders – by replacing it with a model of political engagement as
dialogue.
Yet it is a conception of political dialogue that seems confronted by a dilemma that
Rorty himself addresses pretty directly. For while ‘we’ may agree among ourselves
that there is an absence of external authority and that difference should be approached
without a picture of hierarchy, not everyone agrees with ‘us’. For the non-‘us’, the meta-
narrative of political argument as cultural politics may be just another alien imposition.
On the face of it, this is an ethos of inclusive tolerance that doesn’t extend to those
who think (for example) that human rights require a specific religious justification. As
a solution to the problem of reconciling diverse ways of speaking, this is transformative,
demanding that we speak and act differently when it comes to politics, so it doesn’t seem
to be a solution that preserves the diversity of these different ways of speaking. Rorty
himself is notoriously unfazed by this worry: his conception of political argument is
what he calls ‘ethnocentric’ and the argument for adopting it (if you need one) is that
it’s worth trying out in order to broaden ‘our’ sense of community. The idea that we
can improve by being more receptive to the views of others has a quite different emphasis
from an ethos of nonhierarchical difference.
Colin Koopman in his ‘transitional pragmatism’ (2009, 2013) responds by endorsing
the side of Rorty’s philosophy for which values are emphatically local, an expression of a
particular political community. Pragmatism is the philosophical expression of ‘an inborn
American commitment to meliorism’ with America understood as ‘a hope, a project, a
generous past and a fragile future’ (Koopman, 2009: 45, 48). Without ontological
grounds or final foundations, cultural criticism in this pragmatist mode focuses on
social hope for a future horizon that can ‘renew American hope’ and ‘counter prevailing
tendencies in the United States’ (2009: 48–49). This picks up on the patriotic, indeed
exceptionalist, framing of Rorty in various texts, notably Achieving Our Country
(Rorty, 1998a). ‘At the very heart of the pragmatist spirit’, Koopman writes, ‘is a melior-
ist sensibility that consists in training our efforts and energies toward progressive
improvement’ (Koopman, 2013: 244–5).
For Koopman, to be clear, this is what pragmatism offers political theory, but it is not
all that political theory requires. It’s a notable feature of their recuperations of Rorty that
both Chin and Koopman put their philosophy in conversation with continental traditions.
(I will return to one element of this, the relationship to Frankfurt School critical theory,
shortly.) While for Chin, this principally works to provide a critical foil for the construct-
ive account of cultural politics, Koopman turns to continental philosophy in order to
provide additional resources for his project. The pragmatist focus on problem-solving
needs to be complemented by a Foucault-inspired ‘genealogical practice of problemati-
zation’, he argues, which aims ‘to excavate the materials with which we have contin-
gently constructed ourselves so that we might take up these materials and reconstruct
them in a way that improves our situations. Genealogy, understood as a project of pro-
blematization and not a project of subversion, invites the reconstructive reformism char-
acteristic of the pragmatist attitude’ (Koopman, 2013: 247; cf. Rabinow, 2011). In trying
to outline at least a functional complementarity between a Dewey-inspired melioristic
pragmatism and a Foucault-inspired genealogy,
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The difficulty of this project is illustrated in Koopman’s own most extensive applica-
tion of it. Genealogy rather than pragmatism unsurprisingly dominates How We Became
Our Data, a book that seeks to provide a genealogical analysis of the informational self
through a detailed and illuminating account of what he takes to be its three distinct his-
torical vectors in the United States: birth certificates and ‘documentary identity’, person-
ality metrics and ‘psychological identity’, and real estate appraisal and ‘racial identity’
(Koopman, 2019). Pragmatism is only a bit-part player in this narrative, however. In
one respect, it takes on the role Koopman assigns it in his wider theory: while Dewey
and Jürgen Habermas emphasise the importance of communication and the free flow
of information in democracy, they fail to problematise it, converging ‘in their failure
to confront the possibility that information itself can be a form of political impedance’
(Koopman, 2019: 190). It isn’t entirely clear if Koopman’s view here is that pragmatists
just happen not to have thrown a spotlight on the politics of information or if this neglect
is somehow baked into their theories (cf. Koopman, 2019: 191–2). On the face of it, it
seems possible for a pragmatist to call into question the forms of subjectivity produced
by informational power – for this to be the subject of democratic scrutiny, where it’s a
problem. To the extent that Koopman’s position is that this isn’t an available option
for pragmatism and that the doctrine in this instance possesses nothing valuable to con-
tribute to supplement the genealogy of informational selfhood, though, then the case of
informational power seems to be a case study in the failure to conjoin genealogy and
pragmatism, Foucauldian problematisation and melioristic reconstruction. We should
resist generalising from a single case, but it nevertheless seems to suggest that implement-
ing the official doctrine of philosophical pluralism is not straightforward.
Another route out from Rorty’s view of objectivity as solidarity draws on his student
Robert Brandom’s semantic inferentialism, an imposing theory of ‘the implicit structure
characteristic of discursive practice as such’ (Brandom, 1994: 374).3 Norms arise within
practices of giving and asking for reasons, and in accepting reasons and making claims par-
ticipants bind themselves to standards that go beyond their subjective interpretation of their
commitments. What it is for us to think of ourselves and others as normative beings is as
capable of undertaking commitments, ascribing them to others and accepting responsibility
for them. From the perspective of a participant in claim-making, we are held responsible for
our stances and these can be evaluated by others, and in engaging in discursive practice we
distinguish between the commitments that we happen to accept and those that it is appro-
priate to accept. The focus on the explanatory role of pragmatics and emphasise on the com-
mitments, entitlements and responsibilities rooted in social practice are themes shared with,
and enthusiastically endorsed by, Rorty (e.g. Rorty, 1998b: 122–137), although for this
kind of Brandomian approach doesn’t adopt the insouciant ‘cultural politics’ line that
enjoins us to try this way of looking at the world since you may like it: Brandom’s is
emphatically a systematic theoretical project, rather than an ethnocentric move in a game
of cultural politics (Bernstein, 2010: 212).
As this has been developed for recent political theory by Thomas Fossen (2011, 2013,
2019) this moves beyond Rorty (and toward the Peirceans such as Misak and Talisse,
whom I’ll discuss shortly) to embrace the idea that we incur non-discretionary commit-
ments through our practices of believing, claiming, asserting and declaring things. Fossen
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zeroes in on the topic of political legitimacy. Judging that a public authority is legitimate
or illegitimate is a matter of ‘taking a stance’ in a linguistic practice, attributing various
commitments and entitlements to oneself and other participants: it is only ‘from an
engaged standpoint, in virtue of subjects taking stances from different perspectives’
that ‘there such a thing as political legitimacy at all’ (Fossen, 2013: 442). In this case,
to take a claim to authority to be legitimate is to accept practical commitments to obey
while to reject it is to accept practical commitments to treat it as a coercive imposition.
These commitments evolve and the content of these commitments in any given case
isn’t pre-given by individual fiat or communal consensus but is itself the challengeable
product of a process of social contestation. For Fossen, this contrasts with what he
calls normativism, which is the idea that there are standards external to social practices
that we can use to judge them: so that judging legitimacy is a matter of applying such
an external moral standard to society to check whether or not it meets it.
Critics respond that Fossen’s critique of normativism, as the very idea of a moral set of
principles external to social practices by which to judge political legitimacy, is either
incoherent or empty (Erman and Möller, 2014, 2015, 2018). It is incoherent if it seeks
to rule out building a political theory on the foundation of moral principles merely on
the basis of the commitment argument. Identifying a social practice as a practice in
this sense doesn’t alter the options available to participants within it, this objection
runs: the articulation of moral principles remains a permissible move in practices of jus-
tification, until those practices of justification themselves rule them out, and may be a
required move if that is the place that it has in those practices. Of course, one can seek
to change these practices in a counter-normativist direction but this revisionary project
is an activity within practice, which, like other moves in the justificatory game, must
take its chances in the agon of social contestation. If the commitment argument does
not in itself have the resources to establish how the practice of political theorising
should change, then it seems empty, as it isn’t clear what difference adopting such an
approach makes, from a normative perspective. The ‘claim that legitimacy ‘cannot be
determined with certainty, definitively or from a disengaged standpoint’ fails to prohibit
or to suggest any type of normative theory of legitimacy’. Accordingly, Fossen’s line of
argument ‘is not telling us [sc. normativists] to do anything differently from what we
already do’ (Erman and Möller, 2014: 15). There is nothing that follows from recognizing
the pragmatist framework as such that renders appeal to such principles within practices
of justification impermissible.
There is an elaborate and sometimes intemperate dialectic at play here (cf. Prinz, 2020)
and I will focus on only a couple of points. One issue is about where the burden of proof
in effect lies. The negative component of Fossen’s Brandomian argument is on establish-
ing that the appeal to theoretical principles in the relevant sense isn’t a required move in
legitimacy claims. The Brandomian’s point here is that inferences about political legiti-
macy don’t need to be squeezed into a Procrustean bed of derivation from higher princi-
ples in order to be valid. A critic of this position can argue that claims for political
legitimacy are one of those domains where reasoning should have this structure (which
Brandom says includes mathematics and fundamental physics but not practical reason-
ing) but they shouldn’t assume the pragmatic relevance of these principles and this
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structure. The specific case for bringing together these ideas from Brandom and argu-
ments about political legitimacy is the realist one, that the relevance of this kind of the-
oretical principle to the turbulence and dynamism of actual political argument seems
particularly challengeable (cf. Bagg, 2016; Festenstein, 2016). As a pragmatist argument,
it isn’t sceptical, however, and seeks to provide an account of how there are nevertheless
genuinely normative judgments to be made and contested about legitimacy in particular
political contexts, in the absence of legitimating higher order theoretical principles. (This
distinguishes Fossen’s pragmatist position from those forms of realism that retain the nor-
mativist theoretical structure but seek to replace principles identified as moral with those
tagged as purely political.) This suggests a particularist approach to political theorising
but not a vacuous one – or at least it is an approach that only appears vacuous on the
assumption that political theory must have the architecture that this brand of pragmatist
rejects.
Sharing the Brandomian idea that our social practices generate non-discretionary com-
mitments, there is a group of arguments that revive a resonant theme expressed by Dewey
and other earlier pragmatists, to the effect that democracy consists in an inquiring com-
munity – ‘the democratic community replicates the community of broadly conceived
scientific inquiry’, in James Kloppenberg’s words. In democratic and scientific commu-
nities alike, ‘free and creative’ participants ‘set their own goals, determine their own tests,
and evaluate their results in a spirit of constructive cooperation’ (Kloppenberg, 1998: 90).
In doing so it contributes to, and puts pragmatism in conversation with, a broader current
of epistemic justificatory arguments in recent normative democratic theory (e.g.
Landemore, 2021; Schwartzberg, 2015) as well as the wider literature on political epis-
temology and the epistemic character and powers of democracy. One of the peculiarities
of this revival is that it involves a considerable amount of reconstructive labour: while
there is a general vision of the harmony of democracy and scientific inquiry in
Dewey’s texts, the specific arguments for this are not so clearly on display in his texts
(Westbrook, 2005: 179).
Recent work (notably foreshadowed in Putnam, 1992) has tried to reconstruct and
develop the Deweyan experimentalist argument. In outline, the view is that norms and
standards, including political norms, are the product of historical learning processes.
They are tools developed experimentally to solve problems and subject to revision
when they fail to foster cooperation and communicatively mediated collective
action. From this epistemological point of view, democracy is made up of free and
open experimental learning processes and is judged by their ability to develop and
sustain such processes (e.g. Anderson, 2006; Festenstein, 2019; Capps, 2020;
Knight and Johnson, 2011; Raber, 2020). In this way, Dewey and pragmatism
more widely has been one resource for the efflorescence of political epistemology
(e.g. Hannon and de Ridder, 2021). For Anderson (2006); Bohman (2006) and
Medina (2013), it’s an important distinguishing feature of Dewey’s experimentalist
account of the epistemic powers of democracy that it gives a central role to dissent
and contestation. Resting on ‘an account of the multiple epistemic roles of dissent
at different points in democratic decision-making’ (Anderson, 2006: 9), this empha-
sises a view of deliberation as imagination (cf. Fesmire, 2003) and provides a
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rationale for valuing communication among a diversity of social perspectives. For
Medina, this supports what he punningly calls an epistemology of resistance:
Different ways of imagining can sensitize or desensitize people to human experiences; they
can make people feel close or distant to others; and they can create or sever social bonds,
affective ties, and relations of empathy or antipathy, solidarity or lack of solidarity.
Stigmatizing ways of imagining play a crucial role in causing expressive and epistemic
harms [… ] But resistant ways of imagining can contest exclusion and stigmatizations,
and they can help us become sensitive to the suffering of excluded and stigmatized subjects
(Medina, 2013: 26).
Resistance as a necessary friction to test out the truth of our beliefs requires social resis-
tance to stereotypes, mutual ignorance and insensitivity as expressions of social power.
This leads Medina into thinking about different forms of activism that may promote resis-
tant and transformative types of social imagination. He views himself as following Jane
Addams and Dewey, ‘the perfect exemplar of nonideal normative theorizing of social
practices’ (Medina, 2013: 8).4
Dewey can be interpreted as offering a more than purely epistemic conception of dem-
ocracy, and the focus on political epistemology has been paralleled by an interest in reviv-
ing his formative or perfectionist arguments to support the social-critical perspective (e.g.
Kitcher and Alexander, 2020; Levine, 2020; Pappas, 2008; Renault, 2017). From this per-
spective, democracy is justified by virtue of its fostering free communication and open
interaction versus repressing and narrowing. Focused on what Dewey thinks of as ‘the
kind of self that is formed through action’ (Dewey and Tufts, 1985 [1932]: 302), this
line of argument sees democracy not as a decision-making procedure but in effect as
the ‘idea of community life itself’ (Dewey, 1984 [1927]: 328), which is uniquely able
to allow the full and equal participation of all. In this vein, Medearis (2015) and
Jackson (2018) argue that Dewey has the resources to justify participatory forms of dem-
ocracy that address the perceived alienation and domination of neoliberalism. Important
recent interpretations have argued that Dewey is a theorist of popular contention – of class
struggle, strike action, social movements, industrial democracy, civil disobedience, and
coercive political action (e.g. Jackson, 2018; Livingston, 2017; Medearis, 2015; Stears,
2010). As with the experimentalist argument, the formative argument extends beyond
what is seen as a narrowly political conception of democracy to regard it is an ideal
that should shape other social habitats, including, particularly in recent arguments, the
workplace (e.g. Frega, 2019; Jackson, 2018; Renault, 2017). In this way too, Deweyan
pragmatist arguments have provided resources for current thinking in democratic theory.
Both experimentalist and formative arguments have been adopted and developed by the-
orists keen to integrate them within the Frankfurt School and cognate traditions of critical
theory. While the elective affinities between pragmatism and critical theory – at least in its
post-Habermasian form – has been well-recognised (e.g. Aboulafia et al., 2002; Bernstein,
1986; Bernstein, 2010; Festenstein, 2001; Honneth, 1998a) – recent critical theory (e.g.
Festl, 2020; Frega, 2019; Gregoratto, 2017; Renault, 2017; Särkelä, 2017; Serrano
Zamora, 2021; Serrano Zamora and Santarelli, 2020; Testa, 2017) has incorporated these
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arguments into its immanent criticisms of the social pathologies (both terms Dewey himself
uses, as it happens) of contemporary capitalism, in effect reading Dewey through a critical
theory lens. At the philosophical core of this tradition, Axel Honneth (Honneth, 1998a,
1998b, 2014) has particularly drawn on the formative argument to develop his account
of social freedom and democracy while Rahel Jaeggi’s influential account of the critique
of forms of life draws on a Deweyan account of forms of life and their criticism as experi-
mental problem-solving (Jaeggi, 2018: 318).5 Outside this tradition, philosophers such as
Elizabeth Anderson and David Rondel draw on Dewey’s social philosophy to inform
current problem-focused explorations of structural injustice (Anderson, 2011; Dieleman
et al., 2017; Rondel, 2018)
Both in Dewey’s own work and recensions, these two arguments and the relationship
between them are highly contentious. We can ask whether experimentalism avoids, on
the one hand, appeal to a priori standards for the success of social inquiry or, on the
other, appeal to the local ethnocentric convention. The proceduralist answer, that experi-
mentalism can dodge these pitfalls through the claim that standards are justified by refer-
ence to whether they are produced by and sustain free and open inquiry, may be
suspected of either smuggling in a substantive conception of freedom and openness or
of being too indeterminate to provide a clear answer. The formative argument puts some
flesh on the idea of what freedom and openness consist in but at the price of resting on
a conception of the democratic self that may seem itself morally controversial for pluralistic
societies. There is a lot more that could be said here, and much of the most recent current
work grapples in different ways with these issues (including rejecting the terms in which
I’ve frame them). Space allows me only to alight on one important way in which theorists
have cut through this tissue of concerns, through a version of experimentalism that aspires
be both epistemologically compelling and provide determinate moral content.
The justification of democracy elaborated by Cheryl Misak and Robert Talisse draws
on an understanding of Peirce’s conception of truth and the practice of inquiry (Misak,
2000, 2008, 2016, 2019; Misak and Talisse, 2014, 2021; Talisse, 2007; Talisse, 2009;
Talisse, 2014; Talisse, 2021). This is Peircean in that it takes its starting point in a con-
ceptual analysis of truth based on Peirce’s famous idea that truth is ‘the opinion which is
fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate’ (Peirce, 1986 [1878]: 273). (It is
not based on Peirce’s own reactionary and racist politics.) We can see how this approach
sits at the other end of the justificatory spectrum from Rorty. For the Rortyan, truth isn’t
the end of inquiry, democracy is prior to philosophy, and these views should be under-
stood as interventions in cultural politics that aim to gesture toward a better way of
life, while for Misak and Talisse, truth is the goal of inquiry, the justification of demo-
cratic values falls out of the bare commitment to hold beliefs, and these views are epis-
temological insights into the character of belief. At the same time, they share a
commitment to the primacy of practice, however different they are in the interpretation
of that practice, and in the rejection of practice-transcendent foundations for political
values.
One striking feature of Misak’s original presentation of this idea over two decades ago
is her choice of Carl Schmitt as a foil, not least in its prescience, given the increased atten-
tion that has come to be lavished on Schmitt among political philosophers. For Schmitt, in
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Misak’s view, ‘there is no truth or rational adjudication in post-Enlightenment ethics and
politics’ (Misak, 2000: 10) and politics is merely the self-assertion of different groups.
So, for Misak, ‘If there is no objective right and wrong in moral matters, then what pre-
vents one from adopting Schmitt’s line rather than the line of tolerance?’ (Misak, 2000:
11) To say that Schmitt is wrong, the first step that’s needed is to establish that moral and
political claims can be true or false. Here, pragmatism helps out, since it provides a con-
ception of truth that equally accommodates scientific and moral truth. As Misak spells
this out in her interpretation of Peirce, we should view truth in epistemic terms and
think of a true belief as ‘one that would withstand doubt, were we to inquire as far as
we fruitfully could on the matter. A true belief is such that no matter how much
further we were to investigate and debate, that belief would not be overturned by recal-
citrant experience and argument’ (Misak, 2000: 49). In holding a belief, I take it to be true
and to be formed on the basis of adequate evidence. A belief should ‘resign’, as Misak
puts it, if I discover that the evidence speaks overwhelmingly against it. The aspiration
to truth and to responsiveness to evidence, argument and experience, then, are norms gov-
erning our cognitive lives, simply in virtue of our having beliefs at all.
The political lesson they draw is that ‘the requirements of genuine belief show that we
must, broadly speaking, be democratic inquirers’ (Misak, 2000: 106). A true belief is one
that is responsive to, and best fits with, all reasons, arguments and experience. If we want
true beliefs, we should test epistemic claims against as wide a range of different experi-
ences as possible, rendering beliefs responsive to reasons and evidence, and anyone genu-
inely committed to having true beliefs is committed to exercising the epistemic virtues
this requires. Since we need access to evidence, arguments, other forms of information,
and processes of reason-exchange, it follows that we need to live in a social and political
order that protects and promotes this openness for all: just ‘as the physicist who refuses to
take seriously the results from, say, Finnish labs is betraying that his beliefs are not aimed
at truth, the citizen who refuses to take seriously the experience of a minority is betraying
that his beliefs are not aimed at truth’ (Misak, 2019: 1066). In this way, the commitment
to arriving at and sustaining true beliefs entails that we should support a democratic ethos
and institutions and is meant to have a critical force: in Talisse’s words, ‘each person has
compelling epistemological reasons – simply in virtue of the fact that he or she holds
beliefs – to embrace social and political norms best secured within a democratic order’
(Talisse, 2009: 37). The alternative is to admit that we are only specious believers.
The response to Schmitt is at two levels. If we allow for moral cognitivism, then we
can argue (for example) that all human beings should be treated with equal concern and
respect, in support of ‘the line of tolerance’: the Schmittian can resist this claim, of course,
but not by assuming that as a moral belief it is immune to argument and evidence –
merely an assertion of group identity or personal preference, for example. Our first-level
moral beliefs can be justified as cognitive claims within this pragmatist framework but
aren’t of course justified by it. It is the second level of response, though, that pulls the
rug out from under Schmitt, though. At the second level, as someone who seeks to
acquire and retain true beliefs, though, Schmitt is a liberal democrat malgré lui, since
he is committed to the conditions of openness and tolerance that furnish the procedural
conditions for truth: he can reject these conditions only at the price of admitting epistemic
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speciousness. Any actual Schmittian may be unembarrassed by this epistemic inconsis-
tency, of course, but it shouldn’t be a requirement on this account that it actually per-
suades the Schmittian, only that it should be clear to us that she should be persuaded.
The idea that we can only make sense of the idea of our having a true belief, or being
an authentic believer, if we commit ourselves to democratic values, provides an ingenious
but questionable path out from the dilemmas confronted by the experimentalist argument
and is the subject of copious scrutiny (e.g. Bacon, 2010; Erman and Möller, 2019;
Festenstein, 2004 2007, 2017; Lever and Chin, 2019; MacGilvray, 2014; Rydenfelt,
2019). Where the account is most persuasive is in its attempt to provide microfoundations
for an experimentalist argument that sometimes tends to handwaving. Yet this founda-
tional account is challengeable: even if in principle I think that my beliefs, to be true,
should be able, in some sense, to stand up to all challenges, it doesn’t follow that I can
or should treat all opposing arguments as being equally legitimate or set things up so I
must engage with or encourage challenges from any and every quarter. There is, in
other words, a gap between the view of the constitutive norms of belief and how these
are cashed out in methodological terms in particular epistemic contexts. This leads us
to wonder what experimentalist arguments justify by way of a conception of democracy.
For instance, the conditions that it puts on civic inclusion don’t obviously fit with a world
of bounded democratic states (consider Misak’s Finnish labs): this, however, may just
indicate what a radical view the pragmatist conception points to (Festenstein, 2021).
Further, however, it isn’t an argument that the people should rule or an argument for poli-
tical equality in ruling, so much as an argument about the deliberative characteristics that
should condition how we are ruled. So it still seems to need an additional first-level argu-
ment to support the idea that what is justified is a democracy, in a recognizable if revi-
sionary sense; and this may take us back to the formative argument that the Deweyan
provides.
There is a final point to make about how we look back at the pragmatist tradition. One
theme in this article has been how the interpretation and use of pragmatism in political
theory has properly been shaped by the discipline’s shifting concerns and self-
understanding. So it unsurprising that pragmatism has a place in the multifaceted
project of deparochializing its perspectives and concerns (Williams, 2020). One
example is Livingston’s Damn Great Empires! William James and the Politics of
Pragmatism (2016), the most developed attempt to work through the themes of empire
and anti-imperialism in James’s philosophy (although not the first text to emphasise
the importance of anti-imperialism for James) and brings pragmatism in conversation
with the still burgeoning field of empire studies.6 For Livingston, James should be under-
stood as a sensitive critical analyst of imperial will to power, not its mouthpiece, particu-
larly through a reading of what he calls James’s anti-imperialist Nachlass, the speeches,
notes and correspondence that sprang from James’s furious reaction to the occupation of
the Philippines. On this interpretation, behind both philosophical monism and imperial-
ism lies a shared craving for authority in an uncertain world that can be shaped through
human agency. This craving pulls the modern self into fantasies of sovereign mastery or
powerless resignation in the face of a world without fixed foundations. James’s pragmatism
works to ‘unsettle the closure of abstraction, dogmatism, and self-certainty and to resignify
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uncertainty, risk, and chance as occasions for creative freedom’ (Livingston, 2016: 13). At
the same time, throughout he seeks to show that James’s is a distinctively American anti-
imperialism, entangled in the ideology and patterns of anxiety that it criticizes: so ‘idioms
of pioneer freedom, frontier mastery, individualism and democratic faith that give James’s
anti-imperialism its critical purchase also threatens to co-opt his political thought into a dis-
tinctively uncritical faith in the liberal nationalism he challenges’ (Livingston, 2016: 52).
Given Livingston’s subject, there is an inevitable focus on the metropolitan psyche and
ideological formations, rather than on the colonial impacts or political economy of U.S.
intervention. Potential growth points for a more intercultural perspective on pragmatism
that may engage political theorists include the impact (in both directions) of Dewey’s
engagement with China and the relationship of his thought to that of his Columbia
student, B. R. Ambedkar (Kumar, 2015; Stroud, 2017).
Conclusion
I have tried to sketch how recent work on pragmatism has secured the view that at its core
is a set of arguments about the character and justification of democracy and how pragma-
tist arguments have been reinterpreted and deployed to address contemporary concerns
and approaches in political theory. At the same time, it is deeply divided over how to
interpret its core commitments and where its most important contribution lies, and
more detail than this article allows would only enhance these differences. The depth
and spiritedness of these disagreements are as good a sign of the current vitality of this
tradition as any.
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1. Festenstein, 1997 in effect attempts to mark and map this changed understanding for political
theory, reflecting a wider current of thinking: see Westbrook, 2005 for a panoramic view of
the context for this shift, important contributors to which include Putnam, Bernstein, Rorty,
West, Misak, Joas, Knight and Johnson, Ryan, Westbrook, and others, as well as Bernstein,
1992, 2010; Kloppenberg, 1998.
2. See Kuklick, 2017 for a useful guide to recent historiographical debates.
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3. For more on Brandom’s relationship to pragmatism, see Brandom, 2009, 2011; Bernstein, 2010;
Bacon, 2012; Levine, 2019, and for another use of Brandom see Thaler, 2016. Rogers (2008)
interprets Dewey’s conception of inquiry though the lens of Brandom’s social account of
normativity.
4. See also Medina, 2017; Taylor, 2017. For more detail on forms of these claims in Dewey’s texts,
see Festenstein (2019), and on Addams (2002 [1902]), see Medina (2013: 19-20).
5. It’s also worth noting that Honneth’s work on reification (Honneth, 2012) draws on a different
element of Dewey’s philosophy, his conception of experience. See Owen (2007) and Kitcher
(2020) on the Deweyan strand in Honneth’s critical theory.
6. One of the field’s foremost proponents, Duncan Bell (2018, 2020) makes a case for H. G. Wells
as a pragmatist, whose pragmatism underpins some of his social speculation. It is also worth
noting Scott Pratt’s earlier and highly original interpretation of pragmatism as a response to
settler colonialism (Pratt, 2002).
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